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Abstract 
Many services and applications run on platforms, such as operating systems, Web service 
platforms, and video game consoles. “Lock-in customers and locking-out competitors” is an 
important strategy for platform providers, who can lock in adopters by creating substantial cross-
platform switching costs (e.g. by creating incompatibility and reducing interoperability). This 
paper examines whether such lock-in strategy benefits proprietary platform providers. Using a 
two-period duopoly model in which platform adopters are heterogeneous in their tastes and 
willingness-to-pay, we give conditions under which the lock-in strategy benefits or hurts platform 
providers. When a proprietary platform competes against an open-source-based platform, the 
proprietary platform should not lock-in its adopters. But if the platform battle is between two 
proprietary platforms, platform providers should lock-in adopters if the following two parameters 
are sufficiently large: (i) the adopter’s lowest willingness-to-pay and (ii) the relative dispersion of 
adopter willingness-to-pay. Lastly, this paper shows how naïve adopter expectations affect the 
platform provider’s incentives to lock-in adopters. 
Keywords:  Lock in, switching costs, proprietary and open-source platforms  
Introduction 
Today many services and products are organized around platforms. These platforms compete in various markets. 
Examples include Windows and Linux (operating systems), J2EE and Microsoft’s .NET (Web service platforms), 
Microsoft’s Xbox360 and Sony’s PS3 (video game consoles), Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) and Mozilla’s 
Firefox (Internet browsers), Intel’s Vivi and Apple’s Sonos (digital entertainment platforms), and Real Player, 
Media Player, and QuickTime (media players). 
In some markets, consumers can easily switch from one platform to another (e.g. Internet browsers). Yet many 
platforms are characterized with a phenomenon called lock-in, which ties platform adopters on a single platform 
with high switching costs that can be endogenously generated by a platform provider (Klemperer 1995). Thus, “lock 
in customers and lock out competitors” can be a firm’s deliberate strategy (Klemperer 1987a, Chen and Hitt 2002). 
Take the computer industry as an example: a platform provider may lock-in adopters in many ways: (1) using 
proprietary data storage formats that lack interoperability with other platforms; (2) designing a platform 
incompatible with hardware and software developed by other platform providers; or (3) licensing the platform under 
the condition that adopters do not use other platforms (Kucharik 2003). 
Microsoft is allegedly employing the lock-in strategy. Its Web service platform .NET was widely seen as another 
name for lock-in (Berinato 2005). As Jonathan Schwartz, chief strategy officer for Sun, argued that “Microsoft is 
going to operate a Web services network, not just the software tools to build applications. Its business model is to 
lock in corporate customers and consumers” (Lohr 2002). Potential adopters worried that if .NET only worked on 
Microsoft’s Windows platform, they might be required to replace their existing IT assets to create a homogeneous 
Microsoft IT server environment. IBM warned that “Microsoft has built its business on a model that forces 
customers to spend money on software upgrades every few years. Every successive upgrade restricts Microsoft’s 
client base to fewer options and increased dependence on its platform” (IBM 2004). Apparently the purpose of lock-
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in is to obtain a monopoly power over locked-in adopters, and to exploit them in the future. This is why Microsoft’s 
“embrace-and-extend” strategy is often derided as “engulf-and-devour” strategy.  
For many years, customers and vendors have been worried about this “lock-in” business model. As a response, the 
open source movement is gaining momentum in the software industry. Open source refers to the free distribution, 
modification, and usage of software source codes. For example, J2EE, the .NET’s rival, is an open-source Web 
service platform accessible to, and supported by, many vendors. Its openness encourages interoperability. IBM 
argued that J2EE adopters would not be locked-in because they have the choice of vendor products and tools (IBM 
2004). The open source movement is being promoted by governments, especially in developing nations such as 
India, China, and Brazil. The Indian government promotes the open source with a belief that India has a good pool 
of IT talent that other developing countries cannot match. The Chinese government backs the open source to avoid 
continuously feeding cash to proprietary platforms after locked-in. (Marson 2005). Facing the open source 
competition, should a platform provider such as Microsoft still continue to employ a “lock-in” strategy? 
Competition comes not only from open-source platforms but also from other proprietary platforms. The grid 
computing market has a number of competing proprietary platforms, such as Microsoft’s Dynamic Systems 
Initiative (DSI), IBM and CA’s on-demand computing, Hewlett-Packard’s Adaptive Enterprise, Sun’s N1, and 
Oracle’s Grid Computing. These platforms are not interoperable with each other (at least in their current forms), and 
may lead to vendor lock-in (Longworth 2004). In the video game console market, Sony’s Play Station is the major 
proprietary opponent of Microsoft’s Xbox; the next-generation DVD standards have split the industry into two 
camps: Blu-ray backed by Sony and HD-DVD backed by Microsoft. Both standards are so different that it is 
infeasible to design a single platform to support both. Such incompatibility generates high cross-platform switching 
costs, which may enable vendors to lock in their customers and then charge high prices for video games and 
platform upgrades. In the digital music player market, Apple’s iPod uses a DRM (digital rights management) 
scheme different from that of Microsoft’s Origami. Music purchased from Apple’s iTunes online store cannot be 
directly played on Microsoft’s Origami. Thus, lock-in is highly likely (Miller, 2005). Apple currently charges 99 
cents per download on its iTunes online store (partly to drive iPod sales), but it  may charge higher prices once a big 
number of iPod users are locked in. Other examples include locking consumers in a specific channel (Viswanathan 
2005) or to a specific online service provider (Chen and Hitt 2002).   
The lock-in issues illustrated by these examples give rise to a set of critical research questions regarding its effects 
on platform providers and adopters. 
•  To compete against a zero-price, open-source platform, is it optimal for a proprietary platform to use the “lock-
in” strategy? 
•  When the competition is between two proprietary platforms, should both always lock in their adopters? 
This paper uses a simple two-period duopoly model to examine these research questions. Platform adopters are 
heterogeneous in terms of both their tastes and their willingness-to-pay. Intuitively locking in adopters enables a 
proprietary platform to obtain monopoly profits in the post-adoption period (period 2). But two effects are associated 
with the lock-in strategy. First, rational adopters foretell a high monopoly price in the future. Then they would be 
reluctant to adopt a platform with lock-in, or ask for an extremely low “introductory price” in the pre-adoption 
period (period 1). Thus, the lock-in strategy might not always be beneficial to platform providers. Second, platform 
providers realize that if they have larger market shares in period 1, they would have higher monopoly profits in 
period 2. Consequently, they would aggressively fight for the market share in period 1. Such fierce competition 
could hurt platform providers. Overall it is not clear under what specific conditions the lock-in benefits or hurts 
platform providers. Therefore, a rigorous model is needed to analyze our research questions.   
Related Literature 
This paper is related to a stream of literature on switching costs (see Farrell and Klemperer 2004 for a review). Most 
studies (Klemperer 1987a, 1987b, 1995; Mariñoso 2001; Caminal and Matutes 1990; Kim et al. 2001, Viswanathan 
2005) considered the competition between two proprietary platforms, but little is known about the competition 
between an open-source platform and a proprietary platform with lock-in. Recently, there is an emerging literature 
on open source (Lerner and Tirole 2002; Mustonen 2002; Frost 2005), but few studies consider the lock-in strategy 
in the context of platform competition where a zero-price, open-source platform is involved.  
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In addition, earlier studies only considered one-dimensional heterogeneity in adopters (i.e., preferences). For 
mathematical tractability, these papers assumed that consumers had the same reservation price, which was 
sufficiently high to ensure that none was priced out of the market. In reality, however, some of the low-end adopters 
can be priced out of the market after being locked-in (IBM 2004; Farrell and Klemperer 2004). The reason is that a 
proprietary platform characterized with lock-in has a lower price in period 1 and a higher price in period 2 
(Klemperer 1995). Also, firms with higher willingness-to-pay (say, larger firms) and firms with lower willingness-
to-pay (say, smaller firms) exhibit different adoption patterns (Gartner 2003). This motivates us to introduce another 
parameter, adopter willingness-to-pay, to represent this heterogeneity among adopters. Comparing with prior 
studies, this will allow us to examine the relationship between adopter heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay and 
platform providers’ incentives to use the lock-in strategy. 1 
Platform providers may lock-in adopters by deliberately creating switching costs that can be “artificial,” such as 
offering coupons (Caminal and Matutes 1990) and providing rewards (Kim, et al. 2001), or be “real,” such as 
producing incompatible components in the future period (Mariñoso 2001). In this paper, platform providers, if they 
want to lock-in adopters, generate incompatibility among platforms or reduce interoperability with other platforms 
in period 1. 
The Model: A Two-period Game 
Two platform providers, named A and B, license their platforms with a zero marginal cost. Platform A and B 
compete in licensing prices in each period. Prices are announced simultaneously. Both platform providers cannot set 
prices based on adopters’ types, either because they are unable to observe adopters’ types, or because they are 
prohibited from price discrimination. If B is an open platform rather than a proprietary platform, we denote it by O 
rather than B. The open platform’s licensing price is always zero; the proprietary platform provider cannot pre-
commit her second-period price2. In practice, the pre-commitment can lead to opportunism (Farrell and Shapiro 
1989). The uncertainty about future upgrades and platform enhancements makes the price pre-commitment 
incredible. Even though the proprietary platform provider pre-commits her future price, she may add new features 
on the legacy platform, and then charge locked-in adopters for upgrading services. Microsoft often changes its 
programming models so that it has an opportunity to charge locked-in adopters for training their software engineers. 
For simplicity, we assume that the sum of other costs, such as contract costs and maintenance costs, is the same for 
adopting either platform A or B (O) and is normalized to zero. Therefore, the cost of adopting a platform equals to 
that platform’s licensing price.  
A group of platform adopters of measure 1 and two competing platforms stay in the market for two periods. Each 
adopter adopts at most one platform in each period. Adopters are represented by parameters ( ),r θ , where r  is an 
adopter’s willingness-to-pay, and θ  is her taste (see Figure 1).  
Adopters have heterogeneous tastes because both platforms are differentiated in terms of their features. For example, 
J2EE has a better legacy integration story than .NET; the average salary of .NET (or C#) developers is lower than 
that of J2EE (or JAVA) developers; J2EE is supported by the entire industry of 50+ assorted vendors while .NET is 
supported by Microsoft only. Adopters are heterogeneous in their willingness-to-pay for many reasons. For instance, 
average adopters in developing nations have lower willingness-to-pay than those in developed nations; companies 
with losses have lower willingness-to-pay than those with high profits. 
                                                          
1 The idea of two-dimensional heterogeneity in consumers is related to Tyagi (2004). But Tyagi studied the effects of transaction 
cost reduction on consumers, who have heterogeneous valuation of quality and transaction costs reduction. It was a different 
research topic from ours. 
2 If the price commitment is credible, Von Weizsäcker (1984) has shown that the presence of switching cost makes the market 
more competitive. But if the price commitment is incredible, Klemperer (1987b) indicates that switching costs could reduce the 
competitiveness of the market. Bensaid and Lesne (1996) have shown the difference between price pre-commitment and non-pre-
commitment. 
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Adopters 
 
The adopter taste (θ ) is uniformly distributing with unit density on [ ]0,1  . Platform A is located at 0 while B (or O) 
is located at 1. The adopter willingness-to-pay ( r ) is independent of θ  and uniformly distributing on ( ), 1R Rλ+    
with a density function ( )1 Rλ . These assumptions ensure that the market size is 1. We assume 0 1λ< ≤ , implying 
that the highest willingness-to-pay is at most two times as the lowest willingness-to-pay.  Since R Rλ λ= , the 
dispersion of willingness-to-pay divided by the lowest willingness-to-pay, we call λ  relative dispersion. Further, 
we assume 1R ≥  to ensure that the open-source-based platform is always affordable to all adopters. Platform 
providers can charge their platform adopters directly or indirectly. For example, Microsoft may directly charge 
gamers for Xbox360 video game consoles. Microsoft also licenses Xbox360 to game developers. The license fees 
charged on game developers are shouldered by final users – gamers. In the latter case, Microsoft indirectly charges 
gamers for the platform. We ignore the difference between direct pricing and indirect pricing hereafter by simply 
stating that platform adopters shoulder the total price charged to them and to intermediaries3. Denote by itp  
( ), , ; 1,2i A B O t= =  platform i‘s t period total price charged to adopters. If an adopter indexed with ( ),r θ  adopts A, 
she gets a net surplus ( )max ,0Atr pθ− −  in period t. If she adopts B, then her t-period surplus is 
( )( )max 1 ,0Btr pθ− − − . An adopter’s total net surplus is the discounted sum of her net surplus in two periods with 
discount factor 1δ = . Platform providers have the same discount factor 1δ = .  
The sequence of events occurs as follows. In period 1, platform providers determine whether to promote 
compatibility by signing cross licensing agreements or working together to develop and adopt industry standards. If 
yes, adopters can freely switch between two platforms; otherwise both platforms are characterized with lock-in 
where adopters cannot switch to the other platform in the second period. After that, platform providers announce 
1ip  simultaneously (note 1 2 0O Op p= = ). Given 1ip , rational adopters can derive 2ip . Comparing the total net 
surplus deriving from each platform, adopters make adoption decisions in period 1. An adopter may continue to use 
the platform adopted in period 1, switch to the other platform (if there is no lock-in), or quit the market (if she 
cannot afford any 2ip ). 
                                                          
3 We assume that the demand of platform adopters only depends on the aggregate price level charged to them rather than on the 
allocation of this total price between them and the intermediaries. Thus, this paper only focuses on lock-in effects rather than on 
two-sided network effects as in Rochet and Tirole (2004). 
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Open Platform Versus Proprietary Platform (A vs. O) 
First, we consider the platform battle between an open source platform (denoted by O) and a proprietary platform 
(denoted by A) characterized with lock-in. Platform A’s provider is able to charge a monopolist price over locked-in 
adopters in period 2, then some of A’s adopters can be priced out of the market. On the other hand, platform O is 
affordable to all adopters in both periods. Therefore, there are two types of adopters: (1) those who can afford 1Ap  
and 2Ap , and (2) those who can afford 1Ap only.  
The marginal type 1 adopters satisfy ( )1 22 2 2 2 1A Ar p p rθ θ− − − = − − , or ( )2 1 22 4A A Ap pθ θ= = − − . The 
marginal type 2 adopters satisfy ( )1 2 2 1Ar p rθ θ− − = − − , or ( )12 3Ar pθ = − − .  Figure 2 illustrates the adoption 
pattern for A vs. O.  
 
Figure 2: The Adoption Pattern for A vs. O 
 
Clearly, platform A captures a greater number of low-end adopters than high-end adopters. This result seems quite 
counterintuitive. High-end adopters are not afraid of being priced out of the market, while low-end adopters can be 
priced out of the market in period 2. Why does platform A capture a greater number of low-end adopters rather than 
high-end adopters? The reason is as follows. Rational adopters know 2 20A Op p> = ; they will ask for a 1 0Ap <  
4 to 
compensate their losses in period 2, otherwise they will adopter O with 1 2 0O Op p= = . The steep discount in period 
1 is a free meal for adopters. While high-end adopters are exploited by platform A in period 2, low-end adopters 
may just “eat and run”. Thus, low-end adopters can obtain more surplus from adopting A in period 1 than from 
adopting O in both periods. This explains why platform A can be more attractive to low-end adopters. As figured out 
by Gartner (2003) and Forrester (2005), small and medium enterprises prefer Microsoft’s .NET to J2EE. The reason 
might be that Microsoft’s steep discount attracts lower-end adopters (Fuller 2003). 
Given the adoption pattern, we proceed to solve 1Ap and 2Ap  using a backward induction. Denote platform A’s 
market share in the high-end market by 2Aθ , we have  
                                                          
4 Note that the marginal cost of licensing the platform is normalized to zero. 1 0Ap <  means that platform A charges a price 
lower than its marginal cost. In practice, the price of Microsoft’s Xbox360 was lower than the marginal cost; wireless phone 
service providers offer free cell phones to consumers who commit to purchase their service plans. 
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LEMMA 1. The proprietary platform A’s second-period price 2Ap is 
    ( )22 2 2 213 2 2 6A A A Ap R R Rθ θ λ θ
 = − + − +  
.           (1) 
Adopters are rational and foresighted. After 1Ap  is announced, high-end adopters form correct expectations before 
making adoption decisions (Katz and Shapiro 1985), implying that ( )2 1 22 4A A Ap pθ = − −  and (1) hold 
simultaneously. Solving this equation system for 2Ap  and 2Aθ  yields ( )2 2 1A A Ap p p= , ( )2 2 1A A Apθ θ= . Hence, 2Aπ  
can be expressed as ( )2 1A Apπ , and platform A’s total profit can be written as 
    ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1 2 1A A A A A A A Ad p p pπ π π π= + = ⋅ + , 
where ( )1 1A Ad p  is platform A’s demand in period 1. Solving the F.O.C. yields 1Ap . There is no closed-form 
solution for 1Ap though. But if R →∞ , we have the following simple analytical expressions.  
LEMMA 2: Platform A’s equilibrium prices in periods 1 and 2 are, respectively:  
( ) ( )1 15 2 6Ap Rλ λ= + + −   ,                                       (2) 
( ) ( )2 3 1 2 6Ap Rλ λ= − + +   , ( )3 2 6Aπ λ= +   . 
It can be shown that (2) is a reasonable approximation of 1Ap  as long as R is sufficiently large.  
To examine whether the lock-in strategy helps the provider of the proprietary platform A, we further construct the 
results for the platform battle between A and O without any switching costs.  It is straightforward to get  
1 2 1 2
N N
A Ap p= = , 1 4
N
Aπ = , where the superscript “N” stands for “no switching costs”. Numerical experiments show 
that NA Aπ π≤  (see Figure 8 in Appendix). Proposition 1 gives a rigorous proof. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Considering the platform battle between an open-source-based platform and a proprietary 
platform, the proprietary platform provider should not lock in its adopters.  
 
It should be note that Proposition 1 does not depends on Lemma 2 and the assumption R →∞ . We prove this 
Proposition without deriving analytical solution of Aπ . The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. The open 
platform is able to commit its second-period price ( )2 0Op = . Such price commitment is platform O’s key advantage 
over platform A since platform A is unable to pre-commits 2Ap . Foresighted adopters know that if they adopt 
platform A, they will be heavily exploited in period 2. To attract adopters, platform A needs to set a substantially 
low 1Ap . But a low 1Ap  not only attracts higher-willingness-to-pay adopters but also some lower-willingness-to-pay 
adopters who will be priced out of the market in period 2. That is, platform A captures some unworthy adopters, 
who cannot be exploited in period 2. Such allocation inefficiency is mainly due to platform A’s inability to pre-
commit her second-period price. The proof of Proposition 1 shows that if A were able to commit 2Ap , she is better 
off by charging the same price in both periods.  
In an identical market without any switching costs, adopters are myopic because they are not afraid of being locked-
in. In this case, price commitment is worthless to platforms. Platform O’s strength disappears. Therefore, platform A 
can get a higher profit than that when it locks-in adopters.  
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Platform Battle between Two Proprietary Platforms (A vs. B) 
In this section, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium (see Figure 3) with 1 2 1 2A Aθ θ= = . The backward induction 
is used to derive 1ip  and 2ip  ( ),i A B= . Substituting 2 1 2Aθ =  into (1) yields 2 2 2A Bp p p= = . Platform A’s total 
profit is ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2,A A A B A Ap pπ π π θ= + . Solving ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1A A A A A A A Ad dp d dp d d d dpπ π π θ θ= + ⋅  and 
1 1 1A Bp p p= =   for 1p  yields equilibrium prices in period 1.  
 
Figure 3: The Symmetric Equilibrium for A vs. B with Lock-in 
 
LEMMA 3: Considering the platform battle between two proprietary platforms A and B, the licensing prices at the 
symmetric equilibrium are as follows. 











,      (4) 
where ( ) ( )3 2 21 5 2 1 72 6 44 80 29u R v v R R= − − − − + , ( ) ( )20 2 1 12 4 5 48 5 504 5u R v R R v v = − − + + − − +    ,  
( )21 2 2 1 6x R v = − +  , ( ) ( )
2
0 2 1 12 4 27 2x R v R v = − − + − −   , ( )
22 1 12w R v= − + , and v Rλ= . 
Further, if R →∞ , then 1 1 2 2A Bp p Rλ= = + − , ( )2 2 1 2A Bp p R λ= = − − , ( )3 2 8A Bπ π λ= = + .  
Considering the platform battle without any switching costs, it is straightforward to obtain  
1 2 1 2 1
N N N N
A A B Bp p p p= = = = , 1
N N
A Bπ π= = , where the superscript “N” represents “no switching costs”. 
5 Comparing 
these results with Lemma 3, we have: 
                                                          
5 If there are no switching costs, adopters care only about the payoff in the current period because they can freely switch to 
another platform in the future. Marginal adopters ( )1,r θ satisfies ( )1 1 1 11A Br p r pθ θ− − = − − − . Platform A’s problem is 
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PROPOSITION 2: Considering  the competition between two proprietary platforms A and B, lock-in benefits both 
platform providers as long as λ  and R are sufficiently large (i.e., ˆλ λ>  and ˆR R> ); otherwise lock-in hurts both 
platform providers. 
 
Here R̂  and λ̂  represent the threshold values. The specific values of R̂  and λ̂ , as well as the comparative statistics 
are given in Appendix. We use them to explain the intuition of proposition 2. 6 If both platforms are characterized 
with lock-in, then ( )2 2 1 2 0A A Rd d Rπ θ λ→∞ = − + > (the monopoly profit in period 2 increases with 2Aθ ). Hence, 
platform providers have incentives to fight for larger market share in period 1. Note that 2 2 1 0A A Rdp dθ λ→∞ = − ≤  
(the second-period price decreases with 2Aθ ). Foresighted adopters realize that a lower price in period 1 implies a 
lower price in the future ( )1 2 2A A Ap pθ↓→ ↑→ ↓ . Thus, the demand elasticity is greater than that in an identical 
market without any switching costs7. Platform providers would find that it is easier to capture adopters in period 1 
by lowering their first-period prices. Consequently, the lock-in could trigger a price war in period 1 and then 
intensify the overall competition, making both platform providers worse off than there are no switching costs.  
On the other hand, a larger λ (the relative dispersion) makes it more difficult for platform providers to capture high-
end adopters by lowering the first-period price. This fact can be illustrated by ( )2 1 3 6 4A Ad dpθ λ= + , which is a 
decreasing function of λ . As a result, platform providers would be less aggressive in fighting for the market when 
they realize that it is difficult to do so. Consequently, the overall competition can be softened; and the lock-in 
strategy can benefit platform providers.  
Finally, a small R tends to reduce platform provider’s desirability to lock in her adopters. The intuition is as follows. 
In the platform battle with lock-in, platform providers lose some demands in period 2 because some of the low-end 
adopters will be priced out of the market. If R is sufficiently large, the monopoly profits obtained from high-end 
adopters can cover the losses of losing low-end adopters’ demands. But if R is small, platform providers only get a 
low profit margin from each locked-in adopter; and the monopoly profit is too low to compensate the demand loss. 
In such case, each adopter is worthy to platform providers. Thus, platform providers should capture all of them in 
both periods, and the lock-in strategy should be rejected.  
Proposition 2 generates important managerial implications to platform providers. First, the lock-in strategy does not 
always benefit platform providers because it could intensify the overall competition. Second, platform providers 
only lock-in adopters under the following conditions: (1) the market parameters reduce the overall competition with 
lock-in, and (2) the monopoly profits in the post-adoption period are sufficiently high to compensate the allocation 
inefficiency generated by the lock-in.  
Myopic Adopters 
The above analysis assumes that adopters are foresighted and make adoption decisions based on their payoffs in two 
periods. Yet not all adopters are foresighted in the real world. For example, if a CIO has a better performance in the 
current period, her value in the external or internal labor market would increase. In such case, the CIO might only 








p θ− . The Nash equilibrium for this game is 1 1 1A Bp p= =  and 1 1 2θ = . 
It is easy to verify that nobody is priced out of the market in period 1. Similarly, 2 2 1A Bp p= = , 2 1 2θ = , thus 1
N
Aπ = . 
6 It should be note that the proof of Proposition 2 does not depend on R →∞ . The analytical expressions of comparative 
statistics are complicated, while expressions for R →∞  are quite simple. Thus we use them for presentation only.  












→ ∞ = = −
+
 in the platform battle with lock-
in, and 1Nη = −  in the platform battle with zero switching costs. Apparently L Nη η> . 
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care about the current payoff of adopting a platform. She can switch to another company to get a better pay, even 
though the former company is locked-in and ripped-off by the platform provider in the second period. Also, adopters 
could be myopic when they are misled by advertisements to believe that there is no risk of being locked-in.  
We consider a simple case where all adopters are myopic. Then an adopter ( ),r θ  would compare 
( ) ( )1, max 0,A AU r r pθ θ= − −  and ( ) ( )1, max 0, 1B BU r r pθ θ= − + −  (noting that 1 0Bp =  if platform B is an 
open-source-based platform). If ( ) ( ), ,A BU r U rθ θ≥ , the adopter would adopt platform A, otherwise adopt platform 
B. It should be noted that we only assume that adopters are myopic; proprietary platform providers are still 
foresighted. They would use total profits in both periods, rather than profits in the first period, for comparison when 
they decide whether to lock-in adopters.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: If adopters are myopic,  
1) Platform A would lock-in its adopters if the platform battle is A vs. O ; 
2) Platform A and B would not lock-in their adopters if the platform battle is A vs. B. 
 
As highlighted earlier, platform O can pre-commit her second-period price, and thus has a competitive advantage 
over platform A. But if adopters are myopic and do not care about their second-period payoffs, price commitment is 
not useful any more. It would be easier and less costly for platform A to compete against platform O. Comparing 
with platform O, platform A’s strength is that she may aggressively fight for the market in period 1 by charging a 
negative price while platform O cannot do so. Platform A’s strength is not affected no matter whether adopters are 
myopic or foresighted. Proposition 3 shows that when platform O loses her strength in the platform battle with lock-
in, platform A would use the lock-in strategy.  
Recall that if adopters are foresighted, then proprietary platform A and B would lock in these adopters when λ  and 
R  are sufficiently large (see Proposition 2). But Proposition 3 indicates that proprietary platforms would not lock-in 
adopters regardless of the value of λ  and R . These results suggest that the competition with lock-in is more 
intensified when adopters are myopic than when they are foresighted. To understand it, consider a platform battle 
with lock-in and let platform A deviate from 1Ap  to 1 1A Ap dp−  ( )1 10, 0A Adp dp→ > . The price cut enables 
platform A to capture a larger market share. Consider a high-end marginal adopter ( )2,1 2 Ar dθ+  with r  
sufficiently large. If the adopter is foresighted, she calculates her incremental disutility (that is, 2Adθ− ) twice. But if 
she is myopic, the second-period’s disutility is ignored. Hence, myopic adopters are more sensitive to price cut in 
period 1 than foresighted adopters. Consequently it is easier to capture myopic adopters by cutting 1Ap  than to 
capture foresighted adopters. Hence, platform providers have greater incentives to fight for the market by cutting 
1ip  ( ),i A B= . Realizing that the lock-in triggers a more intensified competition, both platform providers would not 
lock-in their adopters.  
Conclusions 
This paper shows the implications of lock-in to platform providers in two scenarios: (1) A vs. O: the platform battle 
between an open-source based platform and a proprietary platform, and (2) A vs. B: the platform battle between two 
proprietary platforms.  
One might think that the lock-in always helps platform providers. We use a two-period model to show that this 
seemingly intuitive conclusion does not always hold. The lock-in strategy has two effects: (1) it enables platform 
providers to heavily exploit adopters in the post-adoption period, and (2) it intensifies the platform competition in 
the pre-adoption period. Comparing with the scenario without any switching costs, the first effect helps platform 
providers while the second effect is opposite to the first effect.  
We construct conditions under which the lock-in strategy hurts or benefits platform providers. If the platform battle 
is A vs. O, the proprietary platform should not lock-in its adopters. The key reason is that the lock-in strategy leads 
to allocation inefficiency, making it difficult for the proprietary platform to capture desirable adopters. For example, 
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Microsoft has been cooperating with its rival IBM to develop and promote the open Web service standards, such as 
XML, SOAP, UDDI, and WSDL. These standards are supported by both .NET and J2EE (Vawter and Roman 
2001), constructing a solid foundation for the interoperability of .NET and J2EE (Microsoft 2004). “Once dreaded 
by CIOs as Microsoft's next big lock-in strategy, .Net is now applauded by CIOs as a nice development framework 
that fosters the technology neutrality they're learning to expect” (Berinato 2005). Therefore, our analytical finding is 
consistent with the recent trend of increasing interoperability between .NET and J2EE Web-service platforms.  
On the other hand, if the platform battle is A vs. B, platform providers should examine whether the lock-in strategy 
intensifies the overall competition. Our model shows that different market environment parameters have different 
impacts on the overall competition. The relative dispersion of adopter willingness-to-pay and the lowest willingness-
to-pay, which are measured by λ  and R respectively, tend to reduce the overall competition if both of them are 
sufficiently large. If enterprise adopters are highly heterogeneous or they cannot correctly estimate the value of a 
platform, λ  would be large. The willingness-to-pay of enterprise adopters is generally greater than that of home 
users. Our analytical results suggest that λ  and R  could be large in some enterprise platform market, such as 
statistical platform and business intelligence platform markets, where platform providers have incentives to lock-in 
their adopters. However, little empirical literature studies the relationship between λ (or R ) and the platform 
providers’ incentives of using the lock-in strategy. We hope that our model constructs a theoretical base for future 
empirical research.  
Whether adopters are foresighted or myopic can influence the proprietary platform’s lock-in strategy. Facing the 
competition from an open-source-based platform, the proprietary platform does not lock-in foresighted adopters but 
would lock-in myopic adopters to obtain greater profits. This interesting finding suggests that a proprietary platform 
has incentives to mislead adopters into believing that there is no risk of being locked-in8. Microsoft stated that its 
XML schema (WordML), which would be implemented in the next generation of Office technologies, was “100 
percent compliant with industry standards for XML”. Microsoft also claimed that it was “committed to open 
standards such as XML to provide the highest levels of interoperability between legacy and next-generation 
software” (Microsoft 2005). However, analysts pointed out that only two out of six MS Office versions supported 
XML schema, and Microsoft’s WordML was only supported by Microsoft’s proprietary APIs (Application 
Programming Interface) and XML-creation tools (The Register 2003). That is, Microsoft is selling its MS Office 
with lock-in under the veil of “openness” and “interoperability”. It means that “fooling adopters” and “locking-in 
adopters” should be used at the same time. Otherwise, the lock-in strategy itself does not help Microsoft.  
If the platform battle is between two proprietary platforms (A vs. B), platform providers wish adopters to be 
foresighted and rational. Otherwise, the lock-in strategy always intensifies the overall competition and hurts both 
platform providers.  
The above results must be understood within the limitations of our model. This paper focuses on the “lock-in” by 
assuming that the switching costs are sufficiently large to forbid cross-platform switching. We do not explicitly 
consider the case where switching costs are finite and small. There are two reasons. First, if switching costs are 
endogenous, managers are more interested in whether to lock-in adopters than what are optimal switching costs. 
Thus, explicitly considering small switching costs does not add many business insights to this paper. Second, 
solving the model with small switching costs can yield mixed strategy equilibra. Shilony (1977) obtained 
complicated results in a setting with homogeneous consumers who have no preferences and who have the same 
switching costs and willingness-to-pay. Thus, it is even more intractable to solve for mixed strategy-equilibra in a 
setting with two-dimensional heterogeneity in adopters. We leave this task in our future research. Zhu (2004) and 
Zhu and Weyant (2003) considered adoption and investment decisions under asymmetric information. It might be 
interesting to extend our model to asymmetric cases. We hope that the initial work presented in this paper will 
motivate other researchers to build more sophisticated models and empirically test our findings. 
                                                          
8 If adopters are not aware of the risk of lock-in, they will be myopic rather than foresighted. 
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Appendix 
Lemma 1: A vs. O, Platform A’s Monopoly Price in Period 2 
There are two possible scenarios in period 2: 2ARλ θ≥  and 2ARλ θ< . In the first scenario 2ARλ θ≥ , there are two 
sub-cases: 2 2A AR p Rθ− ≤ ≤  and ( )2 21A AR p R λ θ≤ ≤ + − .  




A p R θ
π
= −




A p R θ
π
< −
. The case ( )2 21A Ap R λ θ> + −  is impossible because no adopter with 2Aθ θ=  is able to afford A in 
period 2, violating the assumption that some adopters with 2Aθ θ=  can afford A in period 2.  
  
Figure 4: Two Possible Sub-Cases in Period 2 
If ( )2 21A AR p R λ θ≤ ≤ + − , then ( )( )22 2 2 2 2 21 12A A A A A AR R p R pλπ θ λ θ θ= + − − + ⋅   . Solving the F.O.C. yields 
( )2 214 2 2A Ap R R Rλ θ= + − < , violating the assumption 2Ap R≥ . Examining the boundary solutions, we find that 
2Ap R= is a local maximum. If 2 2A AR p Rθ− ≤ ≤ , then ( )( )22 2 2 2 21 12A A A A AR R R p pλπ θ λ θ= − − − ⋅   , 
and ( )( )2* 2 2 2 213 2 2 6A A A Ap R R Rθ θ λ θ= − + − + . It can be verified that *2 22 22 2 0A AA A p pd dpπ = <  and 
*
2 2A AR p Rθ− ≤ ≤ . Comparing two local maximum points yields the global maximum 
*
2 2A Ap p= .  
Now, consider the second scenario 2ARλ θ< . We have ( )2 2 21A A AR p Rθ λ θ− ≤ ≤ + − . Following a similar 
argument as above, we know 2 2A Ap R θ< −  and ( )2 21A Ap R λ θ> + −  are impossible. Solving the F.O.C. also yields  
*
2 2A Ap p= .  Q.E.D. 
 













A A A A
A A A
p R R R
p p
θ θ λ θ
θ
 = − + − +

 = − −
 yields 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 22 1 1 11 7 2 4 7 4 4 8 5 2 14 16 4 5 2 133A A A Ap p R R R R R p pλ λ λ λ λ
 = − + − + + − + − + − − + +  
 (5) 
Thus, platform A’s second-period price and profit can be expressed as ( )2 1A Ap p  and ( )2 1A Apπ . 
The first-period profit can be written as 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2 2 1
1 1
2A A A A A AR
p R R R p
λ
π θ θ λθ ′= − − +  , 
where ( )1 1
1
3
2A AR pθ = − − , ( )2 1 2
1
4
2A A Ap pθ = − − , ( )2 2 1A A Ap p p= , and  
R′  solves ( ) ( )1 1 2
1 1
3 4
2 2A A AR p p p′− − = − − .  
Denote ( ) ( )1 1 2 1A A A A Ap pπ π π= + . Using 20 1Aθ≤ ≤  and 21 AR p R− ≤ ≤ , we have 12 3AR p R− − ≤ ≤ − . 
Substituting 1Ap t R= −  into 1 0A Ad dpπ =  and noting that  
( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 24 16 1 40 14 7 4 20 3
R
R R R R R R t R R t R aλ λ λ λ λ
→∞
+ − + − + − − − − + = + − , 
where ( )( ) ( )2 10 3 3a t λ λ= − − + , we have ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 15 2 6 3 3 0A A Rd dp tπ λ λ λ→∞  = + − + + =     . 
Thus, ( ) ( )*1 15 2 6Ap Rλ λ= + + −   . It is easy to verify that 




4 6 3 3 0
A A
A A R p p
d dpπ λ λ
→∞ =
 = − + + <     .  
Using the result of *1Ap , we can easily obtain 2Ap , 2Aθ , 1Aθ  and Aπ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1: The Lock-in Strategy Hurts the Proprietary Platform A 
 
Figure 5: Platform Battle with Lock-in (A vs. O) 
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In the lock-in scenario, platform A’s profit is ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 3 2 1A A Ap S S S R p S Rπ λ λ= + + + . Since ( )22 1 2S HL= ⋅ , 
3 21 2 1 3S HL HL S= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ , and 1 2A Ap p< , we have 1 3 2 2A Ap S p S⋅ < ⋅ ⇒ ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 2 EA A A Ap p S S Rπ λ π≤ + + ≡ . 
Consider the scenario where there is no switching cost, platform A can get EAπ  if she charges ( )1 2 2EA A Ap p p= +  in 
both periods. But EAp  is not necessarily the optimal price in the scenario with zero switching cost. Therefore, 
E N
A A Aπ π π≤ ≤ . Q.E.D.  
 
Lemma 3: The Platform Battle between Two Proprietary Platforms 
Substituting 2 1 2Aθ =  in (1) yields (3), so we focus on 1ip .  Let v Rλ= . First, we examine whether platform A has 
incentive to lower 1Ap  from the equilibrium price 1 1 1A Bp p p= =  to 1 1Ap dp+ ( )1 10, 0A Adp dp→ ≤ . If it occurs, it 
creates three types of adopters: (1) those who can afford A and B in both periods; (2) those who can afford A or B in 
period 1 only; (3) those who can afford B in both periods but can afford A in period 1 only (see Figure 6).9  




dθ θ= + , where ( )2 2 1 214A B A Ad dp dp dpθ = − − .  The marginal type 2 adopters satisfy: 
( ) ( )1 1 11Ar p dp r pθ θ− − + = − − − ,  or 112 Adθ θ= + , where 1 1
1
2A A
d dpθ = − .  Lastly, the marginal type 3 adopters 
satisfy:  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 22 2 1A Br p dp r p p dpθ θ− − + = − − − − + , or ( )1 2
1
3
2 A Br dp dpθ = − − + . It can be shown that 
this line connects 2
1
2 A
dθ θ= +  and 1
1
2 A
dθ θ= + .  
  
Figure 6: Three Types of Adopters Figure 7: A & B’s Market Share in Period 2 
                                                          
9 It can be verified that if 1 0Adp → , then the interception of 2 0Ar pθ ′− − =  and 21/ 2 dθ θ= +  is higher than the 
interception of ( ) 21 0Br pθ ′− − − =  and 21/ 2 dθ θ= + . Thus, there are no such adopters who can afford A in both 
periods but can afford B in period 1 only.  
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Let 2 2A Adp dα θ= ,  and 2 2B Adp dβ θ= . Using (1), we get ( ) ( )1 2 6 3 2 3R v wα = − + − , where v Rλ= , and 




B B p p
d dpπ
′=
′ = .  Solving them 
for 2Bp′  and noting that ( )1 212 4A Ad dθ α β θ= + − , we have 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 90 7 8 7 3 7 26 30 13
3 4 2 7
v R R v R v w
w R w
β




Given α  and β , ( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2 1
1
4
4A B A A A Ad dp dp dp d dpθ θ α β= − − ⇒ = − + − ,  
1 1 2A Ad dpθ = − , ( )2 1 4A Adp dpα α β= − ⋅ + − , ( )2 1 4B Adp dpβ α β= − ⋅ + − . Substituting these results and 








= for 1Ap  yields (4).  Using a similar 
argument, we may conclude that platform A has no incentive to increase 1Ap  (that is, 1 0Adp > ) when 1Ap  satisfies 
(4). It is straightforward to verify that the second-order condition holds. Lastly, we can obtain the results for R →∞  
by using the similar derivation in the proof of Lemma 3. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: The Platform Battle between Two Proprietary Platforms 
It can be shown that Aπ  is a non-decreasing function of λ (see Figure 9 in Appendix A).
10 Since 
0
0.75 1NA Aλπ π→ = < = , the lock-in strategy would always hurt both platform providers if 1 1A λπ = < . 
Solving ( )1 0AA Nλπ π= − =  for R  yields ˆ 3.472R = . It means as long as ˆR R> , there always exists a λ̂ such 
that NA Aπ π<  when ˆλ λ< , and NA Aπ π>  when ˆλ λ> . 
Further, if R →∞ , we have ( )3 2 8A Bπ π λ= = + . Comparing with 1N NA Bπ π= = , we have ˆ 2 3λ =  for 
R →∞ . 
 
Comparative Statistics 
We use the results obtained in the proof of Lemma 3 directly. ( )22 2 2 2 21 12A A A A AR R R p pλπ θ λ θ = − − + ⋅  . Note 
that ( )22 16 4 2 2 1 12Ap R R Rλ
 = − + − +  
 and 2 1 2Aθ =  at the equilibrium, ( ) ( )2 2lim 2 1R A Ad d Rπ θ λ→∞ − = − .  
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 6 3 2 3A Adp d R v wθ α= = − + − , where ( )
22 1 12w R v= − +  and v Rλ= . It is easy to obtain limR α→∞  
1λ= − .  
Note that ( )2 2 1 214A B A Ad dp dp dpθ = − − , 2 2A Adp dα θ= , and 2 2B Adp dβ θ= , we get ( )2 1 1 4A Ad dpθ α β= − + − . 
Lastly ( ) ( )lim 1 4 3 6 4R α β λ→∞− + − = + .  
 
                                                          
10  The sketch of proof is as follows. First, 1 2 1 21 2A A A A Apπ π π π= + = ⋅ + .We can show that 1 0Adp dλ ≥  and 
2 0Ad dπ λ ≥ . Consider 1Adp dλ , which can be rewritten as ( ) ( )1 1 2, ,Adp d K R K Rλ λ λ= ⋅  where ( )1 , 0K R λ > . It 
is easy to get ( )2 0, 0K R λλ → = , and ( )2 0, 0dK R d λλ λ → = . Consider ( )
22
2 ,d K R dλ λ , we can show that it is 
always no less than zero as long as 2.6R > . Thus, 1 0Adp dλ ≥  when 2.6R > . Numerical experiments show that 
1 0Adp dλ ≥  also hold for 1 2.6R≤ ≤ . Using a similar argument, we can prove that 2 0Ad dπ λ ≥ . The detailed 
proofs are available upon request. 
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Proposition 3: Myopic Adopters 
1) A vs. O with Myopic Adopters 
When adopters are myopic, they only consider the first-period payoff. Thus, the marginal adopters ( )1, Ar θ  who are 
indifferent from adopting A and adopting O in period 1 satisfy: 
 ( )1 1 11A A Ar p rθ θ− − = − − ,   or   ( )1 11 2A Apθ = − . 
Since [ ]1 0,1Aθ ∈ , it follows that [ ]1 1,1Ap ∈ − . Further, ( )1 1 1 1 11 2A A A A Ap p pπ θ= = − , 1 1 11 2A A Ad dp pπ = − , and 
1 1 1 2A Ad dpθ = − . In the second period,  adopters ( ),r θ  with  { }2 1 2 2, 0A A A Ar pθ θ θ θ≤ = − − ≥  continue to use 
platform A while other locked-in adopters are priced out of the market by platform A. If R  is sufficiently large, we 
have 2 2A Ad dπ θ ( )2 2AR θ λ− −  using ( )( )22 2 2 2 21 12A A A A AR R R p pλπ θ λ θ= − − − ⋅    and (1). Substituting these 
results and 2 1A Aθ θ=  in  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1A A A A A A A Ad dp d dp d d d dpπ π π θ θ= + ⋅  
yields 1 2A Ad dp R Cπ = − + , where ( )1 11 2 2 2A AC p λ θ= − + −   .  
Noting that [ ]1 1,1Ap ∈ − , [ ]1 0,1Aθ ∈ , and [ ]0,1λ ∈ , C  is bounded in [ ]0.5,2.5− . Thus, 1 0A Ad dpπ <  in 
[ ]1 1,1Ap ∈ − , implying that *1 1Ap = −  (platform A captures the whole market in period 1). Therefore, 
( )21 1 2 2 2A A R kπ π λ= − + − + + + − → ∞ . Apparently, platform A’s provider gets a higher profit compared 
with the identical market where there is no switching costs. That is, platform A should lock-in adopters. Numerical 
experiments show that such conclusion also holds for small R (see Figure 10).  
2) A vs. B with Myopic Adopters 
Following a similar argument as above, it is straightforward to prove that if 1 0Bp ≥  and R is sufficiently large, 
platform A would capture the whole market by charging 1 1 1A Bp p= − , resulting in 1 1Aθ =  and 0Bπ = . Thus, both 
1Ap  and 1Bp  should be less than zero at the equilibrium, implying that no adopters are left out of the market in 
period 1. Since adopters are myopic, the marginal adopters ( )1, Ar θ  satisfy: 
 ( )1 1 1 11A A B Ar p r pθ θ− − = − − − ,    and 1 2A Aθ θ=  
It follows ( )1 1 1 11 2 2A A A Bd dp p pπ = − + , and 2 1 1 2A Ad dpθ = − . Substituting these results and 
2 2A Ad dπ θ ( )2 2AR θ λ− −  into  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 0A A A A A A A Ad dp d dp d d d dpπ π π θ θ= + ⋅ =  
yields ( )1 1 2 21 2 2A B A Ap R p θ λθ= − + + − . It is easy to verify that ( )2 21 1 2 4 0A Ad dpπ λ= − − − < .  
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where * *1 1A Bp p= , and 1 2 1/ 2A Aθ θ= = . Therefore,  
* *
1 1 2 2A Bp p R λ= = − − , and thus ( )1 1 2 2 2A B Rπ π λ= = − − . 
Using (1), we have ( )22 2 2 2 2A A ARπ θ θ λ+ − ,  and ( )2 2 2 2 8A B Rπ π λ= + −  when 2 1 2Aθ = . Thus, 
 ( )6 8 1A Bπ π λ= = − < . 
Therefore, platform A and B’s providers should not lock-in adopters regardless of the value of λ . Numerical 
experiments obtain the same result for small R (see Figure 11). 
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Numerical Experiments 
 
Figure 8: The Lock-in Strategy Hurts A Figure 9: The Lock-in Strategy Always Hurts A & B if 
2<= R < 3.472 
Figure 10: The Lock-in Strategy Benefits A Figure 11: The Lock-in Strategy Always Hurts A & B 
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